Orthodox Islamic Perceptions of Jihad
Address to the International Conference on Countering Suicide Terrorism, Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel, February 20-23, 2000
Sheikh Abdul Hadi Palazzi
Orthodox Islamic Perceptions of Jihad
I want to thank the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism for the invitation to speak at this International Conference, in front of this distinguished and highly qualified public.
My main goal is to make a distinction between traditional Islamic concepts of jihad and martyrdom and the distortion of those concepts made by Wahhabi “radical” movements which promote terrorism and claim to do so “in the name of Islam”.
This distinction is obviously a more general aspect of a basic dualism, and permits us to understand in detail differences between orthodox and traditional Islam on the one hand – the religion which was revealed by the Prophet Muhammad and whose main sources are the Qur'an and prophetic tradition (sunnah) – and the contemporary ideology that is commonly referred to as “Islamic fundamentalism” (Wahhabism)1.
As a Muslim scholar, I must first of all remark that I cannot agree with this same definition, so common in the contemporary media. As a matter of fact, I personally never deal with “Islamic fundamentalism” or “Islamic radicalism”, but rather with “pseudo-Islamic radicalism”. This depends on the fact that Wahhabi “fundamentalism” is not a legitimate form of Islam, but an evident distortion of Islamic values, an attempt to change Islam from a religious tradition into a political, totalitarian ideology.
Some Muslim scholars, such as my friend and colleague, Professor Khalid Duran of Temple University of Philadelphia, mark the distinction between orthodox Islamic doctrine and its Wahhabi political counterfeit by calling the former “Islam” and the latter “Islamism”.
Professor Duran writes:
“Whether Islamists [Wahhabis] like the term 'fundamentalist' or not, their understanding of religion resembles that of 'fundamentalists' in other religions. This is not to say that Islamists [Wahhabis] are more 'religious' or more genuinely 'Islamic' than other Muslims. A common misunderstanding in the West has it that Islamists [Wahhabis] are the one hundred percenters among Muslims, and that they are the people of Tradition.
This is not at all the case. Islamists [Wahhabis] have a problem with the people of Tradition, especially the Sufis (mystics). Islamism is a late 20th century totalitarianism [Wahhabism today]. It follows in the wake of fascism and communism, picking up from those and seeking to refine their methods of domination. Islamists mold tradition so as to serve their political ends.
This causes them [Wahhabis] to clash with traditionalist Muslims who resist this manipulation of religion for power politics. Islamism [Wahhabism] is not a reaction of people feeling a loss of religious meaning, but a reaction to a sense of loss in the political sphere; it is a quest for power, an attempt to conquer the state, not to regain independence for religion, least of all individual faith”.
As with most totalitarian ideologies, Islamism (Wahhabism) is utopian. Islamists (Wahhabis) seek to dominate by the most advanced technologies; in that sense they are modernists. But their model for an ideal society takes inspiration from an idealized seventh century Arabia and an a-historical view of religion and human development in general. It is an anachronistic mode of thinking in conflict with modern concepts of democracy, pluralism and human rights.
A relevant difference between traditional (or “orthodox”) Islam and Islamism (Wahhabism) is in the way of understanding the link between religion and politics.
Few Muslims would deny that political commitment is part of Islamic ethics, but most disagree with the Islamist (Wahhabi) insistence that there exists a clearly defined “Islamic system”, different from all other political systems. Islamists (Wahhabis) refuse to accept a secular state that puts a member of a non-Muslim minority on par with a member of the Muslim majority, and a woman at par with man.
According to traditional Islamic theology, prophets are sent among human beings to teach them some necessary truths about the nature of God, about ethics, about those actions and those omissions which cause prosperity in this world and beatitude in the hereafter.
It can sometimes happen that those prophets are called to preach in a milieu where a state and a complex social organization does not exist at all, and this causes them to assume a role of political leadership.
This was, for instance, the role of Moses as a leader of the Children of Israel in the Exodus from Egypt, or the position of Muhammad as a governor of the state centered in Medina. Even so, Islamic orthodoxy teaches that this happens by accident, and political leadership is not among the necessary elements of prophethood.
As a matter of fact, the Qur'an uses different titles to describe the Prophet Muhammad, but none of these titles refers to a political function.
The Qur'an says that Muhammad has been sent as an “Admonisher”, as a “Warner”, as “someone who calls to God”, as “a shining light”, but it never says that he was sent as a political leader or as a head of state.
Islamists (Wahhabis), on the contrary, have a diametrically opposed attitude. From their point of view, the diffusion of Islam cannot be separated from the creation of a claimed “Islamic state”. The role of Muslim scholars is immediately confused with the role of leaders of a political movement or party.
Islamists (Wahhabis) continuously repeat the slogan that “Islam is both religion and government”. This is the basic description of their creed. What they forget to note is that those words “Islam is both religion and government” (al-Islam din wa dawlah) are neither found in the Holy Qur'an, hadith (sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) or in ancient, authoritative Islamic sources.
As a matter of fact, this slogan (al-Islam din wa dawlah) was coined by Taqiyyu-d-Din Ibn Taymiyyah, a scholar who lived in Damascus during the thirteen and fourteenth centuries C.E. and who was condemned to life imprisonment for his numerous heresies.
Those who repeat Ibn Taymiyyah's slogan “Islam is religion and government” are the same ones who, for instance, deal with the “liberation of Jerusalem from the hands of the Jews”. Unfortunately for them, the heretic Ibn Taymiyyah, from whom they take their slogan, is the same one who strongly denies any special role of Jerusalem in Islam.
Ibn Taymiyyah openly writes that “there is no Muslim holy place in Jerusalem”, but his followers claim to fight for the “liberation of Jerusalem” in the name of Ibn Taymiyyah. This is a clear example of how Islamism (Wahhabism) is a confused ideology, wherein contradictions are covered up with silence.
While many Western researchers are inclined to describe Islamism (Wahhabism) as a form of “resurgence of Islam”, traditional Muslim scholars see its appearance as a symptom of secularization, as a reshaping of our religion into a modern, ideological totalitarianism. This is especially evident in the Islamist (Wahhabi) deformation of the role of jihad. In the original meaning, jihad is not limited to the military field, but generally means “striving hard toward a goal”.
According to sayings of the Prophet Muhammad contained in the compilation called Sahih al-Bukhari, “Delivery is the jihad of a woman”, while “The jihad of someone who has old parents is taking care of them”. Military jihad was not a form of “expansion of the religion by means of the sword”, but a form of defense against religious persecution.
The Qur'anic verses giving permission for military jihad say:
أُذِنَ لِلَّذِينَ يُقَاتَلُونَ بِأَنَّهُمْ ظُلِمُوا وَإِنَّ اللَّهَ عَلَى نَصْرِهِمْ لَقَدِيرٌ
الَّذِينَ أُخْرِجُوا مِن دِيَارِهِمْ بِغَيْرِ حَقٍّ إِلَّا أَن يَقُولُوا رَبُّنَا اللَّهُ وَلَوْلَا دَفْعُ اللَّهِ النَّاسَ بَعْضَهُم بِبَعْضٍ لَّهُدِّمَتْ صَوَامِعُ وَبِيَعٌ وَصَلَوَاتٌ وَمَسَاجِدُ يُذْكَرُ فِيهَا اسْمُ اللَّهِ كَثِيراً وَلَيَنصُرَنَّ اللَّهُ مَن يَنصُرُهُ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَقَوِيٌّ عَزِيزٌ
“To those against whom war is made, permission is given (to defend themselves), because they are wronged. And verily God is Most powerful for their aid. (They are) those who have been expelled from their homes in defiance of right (for no cause) except that they say, 'Our Lord is God'. Had not God checked one people by means of another, there would surely have been pulled down monasteries, churches, synagogues and mosques, in which the name of God is commemorated in abundant measure. God will certainly help those who help His cause, for verily God is Full of strength, exalted in Might”.
Qur'an, Sura Hajj (“Pilgrimage”), 22:39-40 (Palazzi translation)
As one can see, military jihad is not meant to expand a certain faith, but to defend the rights of those who are persecuted because of their religion. The verses which describe violation of religious freedom as a justification for self-defense are clear in including not only mosques, but also monasteries, churches and synagogues, among the places where God's name is frequently mentioned, and among the places that are necessary to protect, even by recourse to war.
Apart from this, the legitimate form of military jihad is regulated by very strict rules:
Military jihad must be conducted by a regular army waging war against another army. Terrorist acts against civilian populations are not included in the definition of jihad. The collection of prophetic sayings that we have already mentioned, Sahih al-Bukhari, narrates that when the Prophet Muhammad was informed that a certain group of fighters for jihad had killed some women, he raised his hands and prayed by saying, “O God, be my witness that my hands are innocent of this crime”.
The reaction in self-defense must not be exaggerated. The primary example for this is the story of Moses and the Egyptian, as narrated in the Qur'an. In defending an Israelite who was being beaten by an Egyptian, Moses killed the Egyptian. No doubt, the Israelite was a member of the oppressed people, one of those who were persecuted because of their religion and enslaved, while the Egyptian was one of the oppressors. This event could even been described as a legitimate form of jihad. However, the Qur'an does not support this opinion and regards Moses' reaction as excessive. Moses himself asks God to forgive him for killing the Egyptian.
The Qur'an says:
وَدَخَلَ الْمَدِينَةَ عَلَى حِينِ غَفْلَةٍ مِّنْ أَهْلِهَا فَوَجَدَ فِيهَا رَجُلَيْنِ يَقْتَتِلَانِ هَذَا مِن شِيعَتِهِ وَهَذَا مِنْ عَدُوِّهِ فَاسْتَغَاثَهُ الَّذِي مِن شِيعَتِهِ عَلَى الَّذِي مِنْ عَدُوِّهِ فَوَكَزَهُ مُوسَى فَقَضَى عَلَيْهِ قَالَ هَذَا مِنْ عَمَلِ الشَّيْطَانِ إِنَّهُ عَدُوٌّ مُّضِلٌّ مُّبِينٌ قَالَ رَبِّ إِنِّي ظَلَمْتُ نَفْسِي فَاغْفِرْ لِي فَغَفَرَ لَهُ إِنَّهُ هُوَ الْغَفُورُ الرَّحِيمُ
“And he entered the city at a time when its inhabitants were in a state of heedlessness; and he found therein two men fighting, one of his own religion and the other of his enemies. And he who was of his party sought his help against him who was of his enemies. So Moses struck the latter with his fist, and thereby caused his death. Then Moses said, 'This is Satan's doing, he is indeed an enemy, a manifest misleader'. He said, 'My Lord, I have wronged my soul, so do Thou forgive me'. So He forgave him; for He is Most Forgiving, ever Merciful”.
Qur'an, Sura Qasas (“The Story”), 28:15-16 (Palazzi translation)
The Qur'an also says:
وَقَاتِلُواْ فِي سَبِيلِ اللّهِ الَّذِينَ يُقَاتِلُونَكُمْ وَلاَ تَعْتَدُواْ إِنَّ اللّهَ لاَ يُحِبِّ الْمُعْتَدِينَ
“And fight in the way of God against those who fight against you, but do not exaggerate. Verily, God does not love those who exaggerate”.
Qur'an, Sura Al Baqarah (“The Heifer”), 2:190 (Palazzi translation)
When an enemy is ready to cease hostilities and looks for ways to make peace, Muslims must stop fighting and agree to seek a peaceful resolution of the conflict.
The Qur'an says:
“And make ready for those who fight you whatever you can of armed force and of mounted pickets at the frontier, whereby you may frighten the enemy of God and your enemy and others besides them whom you know not, but God knows them. And whatever you spend in the way of God, it shall be paid back to you in full, and you shall not be wronged. But if they incline towards peace, incline thou also towards it, and put thy trust in God. Surely, it is He Who is All-Hearing, All-Knowing”.
Qur'an, Sura Anfal (“The Spoils”), 8:59-60 (Palazzi translation)
Martyrdom in Islam is the praiseworthy path of one who offers his life to witness the Truth. Shahid, the word that we translate in English as “martyr”, etymologically means “witness”, someone whose existence is a living witness, even after his death.
About martyrs, the Qur'an says:
“Think not of those who have been slain in the cause of God, as dead. Nay, they are alive in the presence of their Lord, and are granted gifts from Him; jubilant because of that which God has given them of His bounty; and rejoicing for the sake of those who have not yet joined them from behind them, because on them shall come no fear nor shall they grieve. They rejoice at the favour of God and His bounty, and at the fact that God suffers not the reward of the believers to be lost”.
Qur'an, Sura Al-i-Imran (“The Imrans”), 3:169-170 (Palazzi translation)
Regarding suicide, it is clearly forbidden by Islamic law, even in a case where one committing suicide is supposedly doing it for a good cause.
The Qur'an says:
“And do not kill yourselves, for God is indeed merciful to you”.
Qur'an, Sura Nisaa (“Women”), 4:29 (Palazzi translation)
This verse underscores how committing suicide directly negates divine mercy.
In another verse the Qur'an says:
“And do not throw yourselves into destruction with your own hands”.
Qur'an, Sura Al Baqarah (“The Heifer”), 2:195 (Palazzi translation)
The evil status in the Hereafter of those who commit suicide is described in a saying of the Prophet Muhammad found in Sahih Muslim, another authoritative compilation:
“Whoever kills himself with a knife will be in hell forever stabbing himself in the stomach. Whoever drinks poison and kills himself will drink it eternally in the Hell fire. And whoever kills himself by falling off a mountain will forever fall in the fire of Hell”.
In view of all these clear proofs, one is spontaneously led to ask himself the question: How is it possible for some groups which claim to be “Islamic” and to “represent Islam” to advocate both terrorism against civilian populations and suicide terrorism?
Suicide terrorism is just one of the fruits of a heretical tendency based on the deformation and falsification of many basic elements of Islamic belief. Although those extreme consequences are recent enough, their point of departure must be identified with the beginnings of the Wahhabi heretical movement.
Understanding the nature and theoretical apparatus of Wahhabism is essential for the comprehension of contemporary Islamist radicalism, and also for consideration of possible countermeasures.
In traditional Islam it is clear that military jihad and all other forms of material jihad only represent the external face of jihad. The inner dimension of jihad is the struggle that every Muslim undertakes to purify his soul from mundane desires, defects and egotism.
According to a well-known tradition, after coming back from a military expedition, the Prophet Muhammad said, “We have returned from the lesser jihad to the greater jihad” (raja'na min jihad al-asghar ila jihad al-akbar).
Muhammad was asked, “O Messenger of God, what is the greater jihad?” He answered, “It is the jihad against one's soul”.
This question and Muhammad's answer has always been cited by Sunni scholars when explaining the inner dimension of jihad. Sufis especially have cited this exchange as an antidote to a narrow, military-only understanding of the nature of jihad.
Wahhabis, on the contrary, completely reject this tradition, in the same way that they deny any deeper understanding of Islamic doctrine. The recently vanished leader of the Wahhabi sect, Nasir ad-Din al-Albani, resorted to every possible specious argument to prove that the tradition cited above is not authentic, and that the greater jihad simply does not exist.
On the contrary, we think that meditating on this tradition contributes very much to understanding the present predicament of those who confuse jihad with terrorism. Crimes against civilian populations can never be a legitimate form of jihad for the simple reason that such crimes are driven by hatred, the most irrational of human passions.
Since fighting anti-human passions such as hatred is itself a form of greater jihad, refuting those who abuse Islam to legitimize terrorism is also a very important form of real jihad.
Regarding the origins of the Wahhabi sect, we must remember that the beginning of the eighteenth century of the Common Era witnessed the emergence of a new movement in the Arabian Peninsula. This movement would shatter the spiritual equilibrium of the Islamic world and lead to an explosion of primitive, violent and anti-intellectual tendencies.
The rallying cry of “returning to origins” was the primal scream of a primitivism that destroyed the life-giving variety of Islamic religious culture. Multiplicity of opinion was replaced with monolithic and simple-minded dogmatism.
Eighteenth century Arabia was among the most desolate areas of the Ottoman Empire. Arabia's only claim to fame was the fact that its territory included the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Ottoman sultans were satisfied with nominal sovereignty over this region. Power was effectively in the hand of local emirs and tribal chieftains whose loyalty toward the sultan was dependent on cash payoffs such as exemption from taxation and a share in government revenues.
The city of Mecca was an autonomous district of the Ottoman Empire, under the administration of the emir, the oldest living representative of the Hashemite family. As a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, the emir of Mecca was among the first called upon to express support when a new sultan was selected. The support of the emir for a new sultan was seen as one of the most important bases of popular legitimacy for an Ottoman government.
The man who broke the chain of the pluralistic transmission of Islamic teachings was Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, a descendent of the Banu Tamim Tribe, who was born in the Uyaynah village in the province of Najd in 1699 C.E. Wahhab's father was a learned Hanbali scholar who sent his son to study Qur'anic exegesis, jurisprudence and mysticism in Mecca, Medina, Baghdad, Basrah and Damascus, as well as in Iran and India.
Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's attitude from the beginning was very polemical, and he took active part in scholarly debates. At the age of thirty-two, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab returned to Najd to work as a teacher for Bedouins. He demonstrated proficiency in academic debates and independence in judgment.
Wahhab did not follow the principles of any one of the four Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence. Rather, he liked to reach his own conclusions and was ready to criticize sages regarded by all Muslim scholars as authoritative.
Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab became convinced that Islamic society was degenerate and in need of reform. In his opinion, the traditional veneration of Muslim saints was idol-worship and those involved in such practices were apostates from Islam. In his analysis of alleged “deviations” and “corruptions” Wahhab became more and more extreme. He was finally excommunicated by his former teachers and even by scholars from his own family.
In 1730 C.E. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab met Muhammad Ibn Sa'ud, tribal leader of a gang of roving raiders from Dar'iyyah whose “profession” was robbing pilgrims and travelers in the desert of Najd. As most Bedouins living in Dar'iyyah were completely illiterate, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab had no difficulty in convincing them of his ideas.
Ibn Sa'ud and Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab made a deal whereby Ibn Sa'ud was proclaimed political leader (emir) and Wahhab was proclaimed religious authority (sheikh). The “sheikh” declared that he was ready to issue a religious decree (fatwah) whereby non-Wahhabi Muslims (for example, Sunnis and Shi'ites) were branded “apostates” and “idol-worshippers”.
This arrangement gave Ibn Sa'ud the cloak of religious legitimacy he needed to continue robbing and murdering innocent people. His gang was no longer a mob of traveling tribal rapists, thieves and murderers and his victims were no longer innocent people. Ibn Sa'ud's storm troopers were now “fighters for jihad”, authorized to murder “unbelievers”, plunder their property and rape their women.
For the first time in history, jihad was proclaimed against Muslims, and even against the Ottoman state, whose sultan was considered the heir of the Prophet Muhammad and the highest Islamic authority. This obviously opened the way for many other cases in which the concept of jihad was deformed.
Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab also ordained missionaries (wakil) and sent them to preach his heresy in Mecca. However, scholars living in the holy city already understood how dangerous Wahhab's doctrine was. Sayyid Ahmad Zayni Dahlan was at that time chief mufti of Mecca.
Dahlan wrote in his book al-Futuhat al-Islamiyyah:
“To deceive scholars in Mecca and Medina, those people sent emissaries to Mecca and Medina, but these missionaries were not able to answer questions asked by Sunni scholars. It became evident that they were ignorant heretics. Muftis of the four schools wrote a fatwah that declared them renegades, and this document was distributed throughout the entire Arabian Peninsula. The emir of Mecca, Sharif Mas'ud ibn Sa'id, ordered the Wahhabis imprisoned. Some Wahhabis fled to Dar'iyyah and informed their leader of what was happening”.
(Palazzi translation)
Another scholar of that period, Muhammad Ibn Sulayman Effendi wrote:
“O Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, do not slander Muslims! I admonish you for God's sake! Does anyone of them say that there is a Creator besides God? If you have anything to argue against Muslims, please, show them authoritative proofs. It is more correct to call you, a single person, an unbeliever, than to call millions of Muslims unbelievers. God says, 'If anyone contends with the Messenger after guidance has been plainly conveyed to him, and follows a path other than the one followed by Believers, we shall leave him in the path he has chosen, and land him in Hell, quite an evil refuge!' (Qur'an, Sura Nisaa/'Women', 4:114). This verse points to the results of departing from Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah”.
(Palazzi translation)
When the plea from the mufti of Mecca reached the sultan in Istanbul, the sultan ordered Muhammad 'Ali Pashah, governor of Egypt, to march on Najd and suppress the Wahhabi rebellion.
Among the Sunni scholars who refuted Wahhabism we may also mention Sayyid Dawud Ibn Sulayman, Mawlana Khalid al-Baghdadi, Sun'allah al-Halabi al-Makki al-Hanafi, Muhammad Ma'sum as-Sarhindi and Muhammad Ibn Sulayman al-Madani ash-Shaf'i.
ash-Shafi was the Shaf'i mufti of Medina, who was asked to write a fatwah against Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. This fatwah is cited in the book Ashadd al-Jihad (“The Stronger Jihad”) and states:
“This man is leading the ignoramuses of the present age to a heretical path. He is trying to extinguish God's light, but God will not permit His light to be extinguished, in spite of the opposition of polytheists, and will illuminate every place with the light of Ahl as-Sunnah”.
(Palazzi translation)
Although thousands of Muslims were murdered by Wahhabis, the scholars of Ahl as-Sunnah continued to refute Wahhabism in their books. One example of these refutations is what the mufti of Mecca, Ahmad Zayni ad-Dahlan al-Makki ash-Shaf'i, wrote in a work entitled Fitnah al-Wahhabiyyah (“The Wahhabi Sedition”) stating:
“In 1802 C.E. they marched with large armies to the area of at-Tayf. In Dhu al-Qa'dah of the same year, they laid siege to the area occupied by Muslims, defeated them, and murdered all the people, including men, women, and children. They also looted the Muslims' belongings and possessions. Only a few people escaped their barbarism.
They even stole gifts from the Noble Grave of the Prophet, took all which was there, and engaged in similar acts of profanation.
In 1786 C.E. they laid siege to Mecca the Blessed and then surrounded it from all directions to tighten their siege. They blocked the routes to the City and prevented supplies from reaching there. This caused great hardship to the people of Mecca. Food became very expensive and then unavailable. The people resorted to eating dogs”.
(Palazzi translation)
These events, which we have briefly described above, disfigured the face of the Islamic world. Mecca and Medina, the two sanctuaries from which Islam spread worldwide, were no longer centers for the transmission of the Sunni heritage of Islamic teachings. They became places where certain aspects of worship according the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence were suppressed and replaced by a primitive and literalist cult which was propagated through violence and coercion.
But the drama did not stop there. As with all other forms of totalitarian ideology, Wahhabism is expansionist by nature. The Wahhabi goal was first to conquer the entire Islamic world, and then to expand its influence to the world beyond.
The establishment of a world center for Wahhabi propaganda (the so-called World Islamic League) in Mecca was the final result of a plan whose goal was to replace orthodox Islam with a puritanical so-called “Salafi School”2. Dogmatic uniformity began to suffocate the humane and enlightened Islamic tradition. The distortion of notions such as jihad and martyrdom had a central role in the expansionist Wahhabi ideology.
From the second half of the nineteenth century C.E. and onward, “Salafis” (as Wahhabis define themselves) targeted as their main opponents to be silenced the University of al-Azhar al-Sharif in Egypt and other traditional centers of Sunni teachings. Sunnis have always been alert to sectarian trends in theological interpretation.
The main instrument for the “Wahhabisation” of Arab society was an organization called Ikhwan al-Muslimun (“Muslim Brotherhood”). The Brotherhood's founder was Hasan al-Bannah (1906-1949), an elementary school teacher from Ismailiyyah who became one of the leaders of pro-British Masonry3 in Egypt.
From a religious point of view, al-Bannah was a “reformer” (but not so advanced in his knowledge of Islamic tradition). From a political point of view, he was radically anti-Ottoman. By creating his own sect, al-Bannah's goal was to develop a new ruling class whose ideology would be a form of “modernized” and “westernized” Islam. Obviously, as was the Wahhabi way, he described the fight of his followers against their Sunni Muslim opponents as “jihad”.
Since then, leadership within the Muslim Brotherhood movement is hereditary. Only members of certain families can hope to get important positions. After World War Two, Nasser attempted to outlaw the sect, but this drove the Muslim Brotherhood underground.
In February, 1982, the Syrian dictator Assad bombed Hama, a Syrian city which was a major Muslim Brotherhood center, slaughtering ten to thirty thousand men, women and children. Members of the Brotherhood became more secretive than ever. They learned to deny any connection to the organization, and even refuse to acknowledge that the Brotherhood exists at all.
From this point of view, there are similarities between internal Wahhabi power struggles and those of organized crime. Wahhabi leaders are extremely arrogant in imposing their will on legitimate Muslim organizations and communities.
In most cases, so-called militant “Islamic fundamentalists” (Wahhabis) are from a religious point of view lay people with little background in Islamic studies. They are appointed as “imams” of important mosques, especially in democratic countries where there is no ministry of religious affairs to check their orientation and where imams having legitimate authorization to teach (ijazah shar'i) are the exception.
In most Western countries, members of the Wahhabi Muslim Brotherhood sect immigrated as university students and started setting up legal front organizations in different sectors of society.
The Palestinian Hamas is one of the important Ikhwan (Wahhabi Muslim Brotherhood) controlled organizations in the Middle East. Hamas leaders do not come from the Brotherhood's founding families. On a worldwide level the Ikhwan leadership is as before in the hands of Syrian and Egyptian elements.
For a radical Wahhabi militant who is poor, ignorant and fanatic, his life dream is to throw stones, commit acts of terrorism and become a suicide bomber to murder himself and as many innocent people as possible.
For a Wahhabi militant with a bit more brains, his life dream is to travel abroad as a student and became a full time professional agitator and propagandist. He will spend his life visiting mosques in the U.S., England, France, Germany, Italy, etc., and speak (and it is nothing other than talk) about “jihad for Palestine”, “fighting against the Zionist enemy” and other such slogans.
In so doing, the brainier radical will receive a generous, regular salary and money to finance his activities. He will probably also learn how to collect donations, not only from major donors but also from local followers.
Their doctrine is that “people doing social work can keep the money they collect”. They start collecting money for “poor children in Palestine”, for “refugees in Kosovo”, for Bosnia, and after a week their leaders have new luxury items, which obviously are not declared as private property.
The Egyptian branch of the Wahhabi Muslim Brotherhood controls a charitable institution called Islamic Relief. The Palestinian branch (Hamas) is supported by the United Arab Emirates through Human Appeal International.
Ikhwani (Wahhabi Muslim Brotherhood) beliefs were theologically refuted by Sunni scholars of the Ottoman period. After World War Two, King Faysal of Saudi Arabia was in need of allies against secular Nasserianism. The Egyptian leader of the Brotherhood, Sayyed Qutb, therefore received unexpected financial support from Saudi King Faysal for the Brotherhood's worldwide activities.
From then on, the vast majority of Ikhwans (Muslim Brotherhood members) adopted Wahhabi doctrines. Only an insignificant minority of them are Sunni. Qutb's heir today is Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an Egyptian professor who controls the ministry of religious affairs in Qatar.
The fund raising game exploits conflicts between the Egyptian, Syrian and Palestinian factions of the Brotherhood. As soon as, for example, Saudi Arabia starts increasing its support for one faction of the Brotherhood, Kuwait and the Emirates finance that faction's internal opponents. Real local leaders never have official positions inside the dependent organizations. Their legal representatives are usually employed as figureheads only.
The Council for American-Islamic Relations (C.A.I.R.) is a Wahhabi Muslim Brotherhood front organization. It works in the U.S. as a lobby against radio, television and print media journalists who dare to produce anything about Islam that is at variance with their “fundamentalist” (Wahhabi) agenda. C.A.I.R. opposes diversity in Islam. It is aggressive and close minded. Notwithstanding C.A.I.R.'s clear connection to Hamas, C.A.I.R. has been regarded by U.S. administrations as a legitimate representative of the Muslim American community.
Another branch of the Wahhabi Muslim Brotherhood, the American Muslim Council (A.M.C.), has a monopoly on the appointment and training of Muslim chaplains in the U.S. Army. While non-“fundamentalist” (non-Wahhabi) Islamic organizations are more or less ignored by U.S. administrations, Muslim American soldiers receive “spiritual assistance” from Wahhabi “fundamentalist” chaplains.
These are only some of the consequences stemming from Saudi-American relations.
The leader of the Nazimi-Kabbani organization, the American-Lebanese Hisham Kabbani, recently declared in an open forum with the U.S. State Department:
“We would like to advise our government, our congressmen, that there is something big going on and people do not understand it. You have many mosques around the U.S. It is not an organized government policy to supervise mosques as it is in Muslim countries.
In Muslim countries, you cannot open a mosque by yourself. That is why you see that in Muslim countries you cannot find extremist [Wahhabi] ideology. As soon as you find extremist [Wahhabi] ideology, they [Muslim countries] kick the extremists [Wahhabis] out and bring in the traditional Islamic scholars.
So the most dangerous things are going on in these mosques that have self-appointed [Wahhabi] leaders throughout the U.S. The extremist [Wahhabi] ideology makes them very active. It was by election that these [Wahhabi] leaders took over the mosques.
We can say that they [Wahhabis] took over eighty percent of the mosques in the U.S. There are over 3,000 mosques in the U.S. This means that the [Wahhabi] ideology of extremism has been spread to eighty percent of the Muslim population, mostly the youth and the new generation”.
Kabbani is trying to show Westerners the reality behind the deceptive facade. Over eighty percent of all mosques in democratic countries are controlled by Wahhabi extremists. This is a matter of fact, not only in North America, but in most of Western Europe as well.
Local Ikhwani (Muslim Brotherhood) organizations are linked through a single secret world body. Membership in the secret world body requires an oath of strict secrecy.
Therefore, until recently it was impossible to find anything in writing about the organization's international structure, or even its existence.
Since 1928 and throughout seventy years of Ikhwani activity, not a single piece of paper was ever signed or published in the name of “the Muslim Brotherhood”. Since March 13, 1998, the Californian branch of the Brotherhood has its own web site explaining the nature of the sect as follows:
“al-Ikhwan [Wahhabi Muslim Brotherhood] has branches in over 70 countries all over the world. The movement is flexible enough to allow working under the 'Ikhwan' name, under other names, or working according to every country's circumstances.
However, all Ikhwan groups, in all countries are characterized by the following with respect to their method:
Poliical Activism: By putting political programs for 'Islamisizing' government in different countries (after realistic studies), and establishing these programs through the convenient ways which do not conflict with Islam.
Stressing Physical Health: By forming sports clubs and committing members to regular exercises...
Establishing a Sound Economic Infrastructure: By supporting and (or sponsoring any Islamic project and facing its 'fiqh' problems. By the way, the only accepted source of money to the Ikhwan is its members' own money”.
In the contemporary world, opening a web site and calling its index the “home page of”... is one of the most evident forms of giving publicity to a certain activity. Even so, the tradition of secrecy and the tendency to deny being a member is so deeply rooted that the home page of the Californian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood ends with the following note:
“Important Disclaimer: The maintainer of this page is not a member of the al-Ikhwan party and does not approve or agree with everything they say. This page is for the sole purpose of answering the questions you always had and never knew who to ask. This page has no political purpose of any kind and no connection whatsoever to any organization or institution”.
In Italy, my country, there are two Wahhabi Muslim Brotherhood Ikhwan-controlled organizations: The Union of Islamic Communities and Organizations in Italy (U.C.O.I.I.) and the Union of Muslim Students in Italy (U.M.S.I.).
Although their membership does not exceed one hundred persons, due to a steady flow of foreign funds they are able to control a certain number of mosques in Italy. In the past few years two of their leaders, 'Omar Tariq and Abu Ja'far, were expelled by a decree of the Italian minister of the interior at that time, Nicola Mancino. Their presence in Italy was considered to be “dangerous for national security and public order”.
Religious freedom granted by Western governments is having terrible consequences. Wahhabi radical movements, local branches of those same structures which promote terrorism in Middle East, are taking roots in the countries of immigration. Although they do not represent in their host nations more than 10% of the total Muslim populations residing there, Wahhabi radical movements control most mosques in Europe, the U.S. and Canada.
This situation has many causes. First of all, traditional Muslims do not relate religious identity to membership in an organized group. Wahhabi radicals, on the contrary, are not a spontaneous movement, but a worldwide organized network.
Wahhabis work through thousands of different front groups. The secret Muslim Brotherhood is always the inner circle behind the stage.
From this point of view, the distinction between “moderate” and “extremist” regimes in the Muslim world reveals its inner weakness.
Countries such as Sudan, Iran and Afghanistan are easily identified as radical, totalitarian and enemies of the Western world, but their contribution to the international network of pseudo-Islamic Wahhabi “fundamentalism” is insignificant.
On the contrary, the powerful structure of the Wahhabi Muslim Brotherhood is mainly supported by those countries regarded as “moderate” and “friends of the West”: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Arab Emirates.
Wahhabi “fundamentalism” is used as a tool for maintaining the status quo in the Arab world. Rich oil producing Arab nations fear peace between Israel and Egypt, Jordan or the Palestine Authority very much. A peaceful Middle East can create serious problems for the autocratic and feudal systems of those Arab regimes.
They know for sure that the diffusion of notions such as human and civil rights, democracy and parity of rights between men and women can represent the end of their unlimited power. This is the reason why these rich, oil producing Arab countries support Wahhabi radicalism as an instrument to block the advancement of education and culture in the Arab and Muslim world.
The more progressive Arab nations are well aware of this plan to preserve Arab backwardness. The governments of Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan are taking measures to limit and to put the activities of the Wahhabi “fundamentalist” networks under control.
Unfortunately, the real risk is that these same Wahhabi groups – illegal in Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan – will become self-appointed official representatives to Western governments of Muslim immigrants in Western countries.
As Hisham Kabbani and Khalid Duran are doing in the U.S., the Italian Muslim Assembly works to inform European governments about the risks they face. While we risk very much in so doing, it seems that until now our cry of alarm is the unheeded voice of one who cries in the wilderness.
The best means to limit the influence of Saudi and Gulf State backed Wahhabi groups which promote suicide terrorism “in the name of Islam” is to counter their influence by supporting the diffusion of the teachings of exponents of traditional, Sunni Islam.
In the same way, non-Muslims must not be confused into believing that “real Islam” is the sectarian variety propagandized by the Wahhabis and their “fundamentalist” networks.
My friend Dr. Asher Eder, Jewish Co-Founder and Co-Chairman of the Islam-Israel Fellowship of the Root and Branch Association, has written a historic essay (originally published in 1969) entitled Peace is Possible between Ishmael and Israel according to the Qur'an and the Tanach, with a preface written by myself.
This essay is of the greatest importance, and I felt honored in writing its preface. It helps non-Muslims to understand that the teaching of the Qur'an is something radically different from what is claimed by “fundamentalists” (Wahhabis). It also helps Muslims to understand that hatred against Israel and Jews is by no means a part of authentic Islam.
Dr. Eder's essay may be considered a small seed, but we are now realizing how it is bearing fruit with the passage of time.
The president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, has recently founded a new Islamic International University in Tashkent. Among the main goals of the university there is the graduation of imams and religious leaders trained in the spirit of the authentic Sunni Muslim tradition, adept at refuting Wahhabi “fundamentalism” and in promoting cooperation between Muslims, Jews and Christians, and sincere believers of all faiths.
This could mean that, for the first time, a Sunni Muslim, anti-Wahhabi (anti-“fundamentalist”) international coalition will at last be created. In comparison with the worldwide influence of the Saudi and Gulf State funded Wahhabi Muslim Brotherhood, the role of such a Sunni Muslim international coalition may be compared to that of David facing Goliath.
However, we are forbidden to lose hope.
As the Qur'an says:
“How oft, by God's will, hath a small force vanquished a big one? Verily, God is with those who steadfastly persevere”.
Qur'an, Sura Al Baqarah (“The Heifer”), 2:249 (Palazzi translation)
1 Wahhabis, as they are called by Sunnis and Shi'ites, call themselves “Salafis”.
2 Wahhabis, as they are called by Sunnis and Shi'ites, call themselves “Salafis”.
3 Masonic United Lodge of England, “Mother of the World”.